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Abstract
In quantum physics the direct observables are probabilities of events. We ask, how ob-
served probabilities must be combined to achieve what we call maximum predictive power.
According to this concept the accuracy of a prediction must only depend on the number of
runs whose data serve as input for the prediction. We transform each probability to an asso-
ciated variable whose uncertainty interval depends only on the amount of data and strictly
decreases with it. We find that for a probability which is a function of two other probabilities
maximum predictive power is achieved when linearly summing their associated variables and
transforming back to a probability. This recovers the quantum mechanical superposition
principle.
1 Introduction
Quantum theory is not yet understood as well as e.g. classical mechanics or special relativity.
Classical mechanics coincides well with our intuition and so is rarely questioned. Special relativity
runs counter to our immediate insight, but can easily be derived by assuming constancy of the
speed of light for every observer. And that assumption may be made plausible by epistemological
arguments [1]. Quantum theory on the other hand demands two premises. First, it wants us to
give up determinism for the sake of a probabilistic view. In fact, this seems unavoidable in a
fundamental theory of prediction, because any communicable observation can be decomposed into
a finite number of bits. So predictions therefrom always have limited accuracy, and probability
enters naturally. More disturbing is the second premise: Quantum theory wants us to give up
the sum rule of probabilities by requiring interference instead. However, the sum rule is deeply
ingrained in our thought, because of its roots in counting and the definition of sets: Define sets
with no common elements, then define the set which joins them all. The number of elements in
this latter set is just the sum of the elements of the individual sets. When deriving the notion of
probability from the relative frequency of events we are thus immediately led to the sum rule, such
that any other rule appears inconceivable. And this may be the reason why we have difficulties
accepting the quantum theoretical rule, where probabilities are summed by calculating the square
of the sum of the complex square roots of the probabilities. In this situation two views are
possible. We may either consider the quantum theoretical rule as a peculiarity of nature. Or,
we may conjecture that the quantum theoretical rule has something to do with how we organize
data from observations into quantities that are physically meaningful to us. We want to adopt the
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latter position. Therefore we seek to establish a grasp of the quantum theoretical rule with the
general idea in mind that, given the probabilistic paradigm, there may exist an optimal strategy
of prediction, quite independent of traditional physical concepts, but resting on what one can
deduce from a given amount of information. We will formulate elements of such a strategy with
the aim of achieving maximum predictive power.
2 Representing Knowledge from Probabilistic Data
Any investigative endeavour rests upon one natural assumption: More data from observations
will lead to better knowledge of the situation at hand. Let us see whether this holds in quantum
experiments. The data are relative frequencies of events. From these we deduce probabilities
from which in turn we derive the magnitudes of physical quantities. As an example take an
experiment with two detectors, where a click is registered in either the one or the other. (We
exclude simultaneous clicks for the moment.) Here, only one probability is measurable, e.g. the
probablity Pl of a click in detector 1. After N runs we have nl counts in detector 1 and n2 counts
in detector 2, with nl + n2 = N. The probability pa can thus be estimated as
nl
p, = (1)
with the uncertainty interval [2]
Apl = IPl(1NPl)
From pl the physical quantity X(Px) is derived. Its uncertainty interval is
(2)
(3)
The accuracy of X is given by the inverse of A X. With the above assumption we expect it to
increase with each additional run, because we get additional data. Therefore, for any N, we
expect
Ax(N + 1) < Ax(N ). (4)
However, this inequality cannot be true for an arbitrary function X(Pl). In general A X will
fluctuate and only decrease on the average with increasing N. To see this take a theory A which
relates physical quantity and probability by XA = Pl. In an experiment of N = 100 runs and
nl = 90 we get: AXa(100 ) = .030. By taking into account the data from one additional run, where
detector 2 happened to click, we have AXA(101 ) = .031. The differences may appear marginal,
but nevertheless the accuracy of our estimate for XA has decreased although we incorporated
additional data. So our original assumption does not hold. This is worrisome as it implies that
a prediction based on a measurement of XA may be more accurate if the data of the last run are
not included. Let us contrast this to theory B, which connects physical quantity and probability
by XB = Pl s. With N and nl as before we have XB(100) = .106. Incorporation of the data from
the additional run leads to XB(101) = .104. Now we obviously don't question the value of the last
run, as the accuracy of our estimate has increased.
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The lesson to be learnt from the two examples is that the specific functional dependence of
a physical quantity on the probability (or several probabilities if it is derived from a variety of
experiments) determines whether our knowledge about the physical quantity will increase with
additional experimental data, and that this also applies to the accuracy of our predictions. This
raises the question what quantities we should be interested in to make sure that we get to know
them more accurately by doing more experiments. From a statistical point of view the answer is
straightforward: choose variables whose uncertainty interval strictly decreases, and simply define
them as physical. And from a physical point of view? Coming from classical physics we may
have a problem, as concepts like mass, distance, angular momentum, energy, etc. are suggested
as candidates for physical quantities. But when coming from the phenomenology of quantum
physics, where all we ever get from nature is random clicks and count rates, a definition of physical
quantities according to statistical criteria may seem more reasonable, simply because there is no
other guideline as to which random variables should be considered physical.
Pursuing this line of thought we want to express experimental results by random variables
whose uncertainty interval strictly decreases with more data. When using them in predictions,
which are also expressed by variables with this property, predictions should automatically become
more accurate with more data input. Now a few trials will show that there are many functions
X(Pl) whose uncertainty interval decreases with increasing N (eq.(3)). We want to choose the one
with maximum predictive power. The meaning of this term becomes clear when realizing that in
general A X depends on N and on nl (via Pl). These two numbers have a very different status.
The number of runs, N, is controlled by the experimenter, while the number of clicks, nl, is solely
due to nature. Maximum predictive power then means to eliminate nature's influence on A X. For
then we can know A X even before having done any experimental runs, simply upon deciding how
many we will do. From eq.(3) we thus get
which results in
x/-NAx = }0_pXl X/Zpl(1-pl)=constant, (5)
X = C arcsin(2pl - 1)+ D (6)
where C and D are real constants. The inverse is
1 + sin(X-_ -)
= 2 ' (7)
showing that the probability is periodic in X. Aside from the linear transformations provided by
C and D any other smooth function o(X) in real or complex spaces will also fulfill requirement
(5) when equally sized intervals in X correspond to equal line lengths along the curve _(X). One
part.icular curve is
_(X) = sin(2)e'X, (8) 0
which is a circle in the complex plane with center at i/2. It exhibits the property -- pl known
from quantum theory. But note, that for instance the function fl = sin(x/2) does not fulfill the
requirement that the accuracy only depend on N. Therefore the complex phase factor in eq.(8)
is necessary [3][4].
317
3 Distinguishability
We have now found a unique transformation from a probability to another class of variables
exemplified by X in eq.(6). These unique variables always become better known with additional
data. But can they be considered physical? We should first clarify what a physical variable is. A
physical variable can assume different numerical values, where each value should not only imply
a different physical situation, but should most of all lead to a different measurement result in a
properly designed experiment. Within the probabilistic paradigm two measurement results are
different when their uncertainty intervals don't overlap. This can be used to define a variable which
counts the principally distinguishable results of the measurement of a probability. Comparison
of that variable to our quantity X should tell us how much X must change from a given value
before this can be noticed in an experiment. Following Wootters and Wheeler [5][6] the variable
0 counting the statistically distinguishable results at detector 1 in N runs of our above example
is given by
O(nl) = Jo Ap(p) = v/_ arcsin(2pl -- 1) + _ pl=-_ (9)
where Ap is defined as in eq.(2). When dividing 0 by N U2 it becomes identical to X when in
eq.(6) we set C = 1 and D = _. This illuminates the meaning of X: It is a continuous variable
associated with a probability, with the particular property that anywhere in its domain an interval
of fixed width corresponds to an equal number of measurement results distinguishable in a given
number of runs. With Occam's dictum of not introducing more entities than are necessary for
the description of the subject matter under investigation, X would be the choice for representing
physical situations and can rightly be called physical.
4 A Simple Prediction: The Superposition Principle
Now we return to our aim of finding a strategy for maximum predictive power. We want to see
whether the unique class of variables represented by X indicates a way beyond representing data
and perhaps affords special predictions. For the sake of concreteness we think of the double slit
experiment. A particle can reach the detector by two different routes. We measure the probabilty
that it hits the detector via the left route, PL, by blocking the right slit. In L runs we get rtL
counts. In the measurement of the probability with only the right path available, pR, we get nR
counts in R runs. From these data we want to make a prediction about the probability ptot, when
both paths are open. Therefore we make the hypotheses that Ptot is a function ofpR and PL. What
can we say about the function Ptot(PL,PR) when we demand maximum predictive power from it?
This question is answered by reformulating the problem in terms of the associated variables XL,
XR and Xtot, which we derive according to eq.(6) by setting C = 1 and D - _ The function
"_.
Xtot(XL, XR) must be such that a prediction for Xtot has an uncertainty interval _X_tot, which only
depends on the number of runs, L and R, and decreases with both of them. (We use the symbol
_Xtot to indicate that it is not derived from a measurement of Ptot, but from other measurements
from which we want to predict Prof.) In this way we can predict the accuracy of Xtot by only
deciding the number of runs, L and R. No actual measurements need to have been done. Because
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of
 lox,o,l l
 X,o,= Vl OxL Z
maximum predictive power is achieved when
0_ 2
oXtot 1 (10)
+ OxR -R
_Xtot
= constant,
j=L,R. (11)
We want to have a real function Xtot(XL, Xn), and therefore we get
Xtot = aXL + bxn + c, (12)
where a, b and c are real constants. Furthermore we must have c = 0 and the magnitude of both
a and b equal to 1, when we wish to have Xtot equivalent to XR or to XL when either the one or
the other path is blocked. So there is an ambiguity of sign with a and b. When rewriting this in
terms of the probability we get
Ptot = sin2(XL -4- XR2 )" (13)
This does not look like the sum rule of probability theory. Only for PL + Pn = 1 does it coincide
with it. We may therefore conclude that the sum rule of probability theory does not afford maxi-
mum predictive power. But neither does eq.(13) look like the quantum mechanical superposition
principle. However, this should not be surprising because our input were just two real valued
numbers, XL and Xn, from which we demanded to derive another real valued number. A general
phase as is provided in quantum theory could thus not be incorporated. But let us see what we
get with complex representatives of the associated variables of probabilities. We take a(X) from
eq.(8). Again we define in an equivalent manner aL, an and atot. From PL we have for instance
(from (8) and (7) with C = 1 and D = _)
(14)
and
0o,r 1AaL = OpL ApL- 2_" (15)
If we postulate a relationship atot(an, ai) according to maximum predictive power we expect
the predicted uncertainty interval _Satot to be independent of aL and an and to decrease with
increasing number of runs, L and R. Analogous to (11) we must have
yielding
OOQot =
vOaj constant, j = L, R, (16)
atot = SaL + tar + u, (17)
where s, t, and u are complex constants. Now u must vanish and s and t must both be unimodular
when ptot is to be equivalent to either PL or PR when the one or the other route is blocked. We
then obtain
Ptot = I, ,o,1 --Is,_L + t, ,l = = PL + PR + 2_cos(¢), (18)
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where ¢ is an arbitrary phase factor containing the phases of s and t. This is exactly the quantun
mechanical superposition principle. What is striking is that with a theory of maximum predictive
power we can obtain the general form of this principle, but cannot at all predict ptot even when
we have measured PL and pR, because of the unknown phase ¢. So we are lead to postulate ¢ as
a new measurable quantity in this experiment.
5 Conclusion
We have tried to obtain insight into the quantum mechanical superposition principle and set
out with the idea that it might follow from a most natural assumption of experimental science:
more data should provide a more accurate representation of the matter under investigation and
afford more accurate predictions. From this we defined the concept of maximum predictive power
which demands laws to be such that the uncertainty of a prediction is solely dependent on the
number of experiments on which the prediction is based, and not on the specific outcomes of these
experiments. Applying this to the observation of two probabilities and to possible predictions
about a third probability therefrom, we arrived at the quantum mechanical superposition principle.
Our result suggests nature's law to be such that from more observations more accurate predictions
must be derivable.
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